The "semiquantum" key distribution protocol introduced by Zou et al. is examined. The protocol while using two-way quantum communication requires only Bob to be fully quantum. We derive a trade-off inequality between information gained by Eve and the disturbance observed by legitimate users. It guarantees that Eve cannot obtain large information if the disturbance is sufficiently small.
II. FORMULATION AND RESULTS

A. Formulation
The protocol given by Zou et al. [3] runs as follows. Bob sends Alice N qubits each in the state |+ := 1 √ 2 (|0 + |1 ) and keeps all qubits he receives back from her in a quantum memory. After confirming the receipt of all qubits by Bob, Alice publicly announces which qubits she reflected (without disturbing them); Bob then checks that he received |+ and not |− := 1 √ 2 (|0 − |1 ) on those positions (CTRL). For the (SIFT) qubits measured by Alice in the standard (classical) {|0 , |1 } basis, a sample is chosen to be checked for errors (TEST). The remaining SIFT bits serve for obtaining a final key via error correction and privacy amplification.
Instead of this full protocol, we treat its toy version using a qubit without the public discussion. This protocol including Eve's attack is described as follows. We consider two situations: CTRL and SIFT. In both situations, Bob first sends a qubit to Alice in the state |+ ∈ H := C 2 . Eve makes the qubit interact with her apparatus K by a unitary operation V : H ⊗ K → H ⊗ K. The whole state evolves into
where |Ω denotes the initial state of Eve's apparatus.
In the case of CTRL, Alice reflects the qubit without disturbing it. Eve again makes the qubit sent from Alice to Bob interact with her apparatus. It is described by a unitary operation U : H ⊗ K → H ⊗ K. The whole state after the interaction is thus described as U |Ψ = U V |+ ⊗ |Ω . Bob measures a projection-valued measure (PVM) X = {X + , X − } := {|+ +| ⊗ 1 K , |− −| ⊗ 1 K } to check whether the state is in |+ . We define P CT RL by P CT RL := Ψ|U * X − U |Ψ , which is an error probability in CTRL.
In the case of SIFT, after receiving a qubit, Alice measures a PVM Z = {Z 0 , Z 1 } := {|0 0| ⊗ 1 K , |1 1| ⊗ 1 K }. The probability for obtaining z ∈ {0, 1} is calculated as p A SIF T (z) := Ψ|Z z |Ψ . The state after the measurement is changed according to the von Neumann-Lüders postulate. If z is obtained, the whole state becomes
.
Alice sends the qubit back to Bob. Also in this case, Eve makes the qubit interact with her apparatus by using U . The whole system thus becomes U σ z U * . After receiving the qubit, Bob checks the state by measuring Z. The (conditional) probability for obtaining z ′ ∈ {0, 1} when Alice's outcome is z is represented as p
. Using these quantities, we define an error probability in SIFT by
. This quantity is represented as
Eve's purpose is to know the outcome obtained by Alice. Let us denote the state possessed by Eve after the two-way quantum communication when Alice obtains z in SIFT by ρ z . It is represented as
where tr H is the partial trace over H. Eve measures a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) E = {E e } which acts only on K for extracting information. That is, each E e can be represented as E e = 1 H ⊗Ê e by using somê E e . We denote by p E|A SIF T (e|z) the probability for obtaining an outcome e when Alice obtains z. It is represented as p E|A SIF T (e|z) = tr(ρ z E e ). We denote by p AE SIF T (z, e) the joint probability representing the case that Alice obtains z and Eve obtains e. This quantity is calculated as p
In addition, the probability for obtaining e is calculated as p
The information gained by Eve is characterized by the mutual information, which is defined by
where
. Eve has two chances to make her apparatus interact with the qubit. It is obvious that each interaction can help her obtain information. For instance, Eve can have an entangled state between her apparatus and the qubit sent to Alice by using V . Although it brings her information, this interaction leaves its trace behind by disturbing the state. Our aim in this paper is to derive a trade-off inequality that bounds I(A : E) by P CT RL and P SIF T for general attacks in which both U and V are arbitrary.
B. Relation between information and disturbance
The following is our main theorem.
Theorem 1
The information gained by Eve can be bounded from above as
where P SIF T and P CT RL are the error probabilities defined above.
This theorem generalizes the robustness result. In fact, if we put P CT RL = P SIF T = 0 in the above inequality, I(A : E) = 0 follows. That is, information gained by Eve inevitably causes disturbance. Moreover, the theorem guarantees that information gained by Eve is small if both of the probabilities P CT RL and P SIF T are sufficiently small.
We employ two lemmas to prove our main theorem. The following lemma is employed to bound the mutual information by a quantity that is easier to treat.
Lemma 1 Let X and Y be random variables. Suppose that X takes a value in {0, 1}. Denote by p XY (x, y) the joint probability representing the case that X takes x and Y takes y. The mutual information between X and Y is bounded as
. The mutual information can be written as
and − x p X|Y (x|y) log 2 p X|Y (x|y) ≥ 2 min{p X|Y (0|y), p X|Y (1|y)} hold, it holds that
Using p X|Y (0|y) + p X|Y (1|y) = 1, we obtain −2 min{p X|Y (0|y), p X|Y (1|y)} = −1 + p X|Y (0|y) − p X|Y (1|y) . Thus it holds that
The right-hand side of this inequality can be bounded as follows:
, where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
The following lemma plays an important role in relating probabilities in SIFT and CTRL with each other.
Lemma 2 For any (possibly unnormalized) vectors |φ 0 , |φ 1 ∈ H ⊗ K, any bounded operator X acting only on H, any POVM E = {E e } acting only on K, it holds that
where · is an operator norm defined by X := sup φ =0 X|φ |φ .
Proof: Using the commutativity between E 1/2 e and X, we obtain
We further obtain where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to derive the second line and the definition of the operator norm to derive the third line.
Proof: (Proof of Theorem 1) We apply Lemma 1 to p AE SIF T (z, e) in order to bound I(A : E). To bound p AE SIF T (z, e) by P SIF T and P CT RL , we compare this quantity with another probability p 0 (z, e) defined by p 0 (z, e) := Ψ|U * Z z E e U |Ψ . Using Z z + Z z⊕1 = 1, we obtain
We obtain
where we used the triangular inequality and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Because |a−b| ≤ c implies | √ a− √ b| ≤ √ c for positive a, b and c, it holds that
We apply Lemma 2 to |φ 0 = Z 0 U |Ψ , |φ 1 = Z 1 U |Ψ and X = |0 1| ⊗ 1 K . The left-hand side of (1) can be bounded as
The right-hand side of (1) becomes
where we used (2) . By using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can further bound the above inequality as
The terms e (2p 0 (0, e)
where p A 0 (z) := e p 0 (z, e) and we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the relation
Thus we obtain
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality again. Because P SIF T ≤ P 
where we used √ 6 + 3 < 6. (Although the above inequality can be slightly improved, we do not treat it here as it is not important.) Thus (3), (5) and Lemma 2 derive 
III. SUMMARY
In this paper, treating the quantum key distribution protocol with classical Alice, we obtained a trade-off relationship between information gained by Eve and the disturbance observed by Alice and Bob. Our theorem provides a generalization of the robustness result obtained thus far. Moreover it guarantees that information gained by Eve is small if both of two error probabilities observed by the legitimate users are sufficiently small. Applying the inequality to the full protocol in order to examine its security is an important future problem.
